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1. Introduction  
 
Serious harms to others caused by persons dear to us—even when those harms are not 
traceable to culpable acts or omissions of our own—seem to have a special normative 
significance for us. We regret such harms, but we regret them in ways that differ 
markedly from the regret felt by uninvolved spectators. To focus on two severe and 
illustrative types of examples, consider the regret felt by (grand-)children of war 
criminals and by parents of school-shooters. Though (or, even when) they 
acknowledge that they are not personally at fault for the harms caused by those dear 
to them, the regret they express may be characterized by guilt-like thoughts, 
motivations to make amends, and the seeking of forgiveness (or something like it) 
(Klebold 2016; Ze’evi 2011). Assuming that guilt is a painful attitude that represents 
oneself to be at fault for violating a moral norm (Lazarus 1991, 122; Cole et al. 1992; 
Lewis 2000; Clarke 2016), and stipulating that the related agents do not represent 
themselves thus, their responses cannot be ones of guilt. Still, there would be 
something amiss if these agents simply and immediately insisted on the fact of their 
faultlessness, occupying the regret of a spectator, ignoring thereby the reparative 
significance that their responses may harbor. Though these agents are not at fault—
and so are blameless in a central sense of blameworthiness—their guilt-like responses 
seem to get something right, normatively speaking. This claim, of course, is 
controversial; I seek to substantiate it in what follows. 
On the basis of cases involving guilt-like responses like those described above, 
together with attention to the normative features to which these responses are 
plausibly sensitive, I argue that the phenomenon underlying Bernard Williams’s 
(1981) notion of “agent-regret” has been misdiagnosed—or at least, subject to too 
individualistic a focus—by Williams and other philosophers. Williams introduces 
“agent-regret” to refer to the pained response agents have for harms they have caused, 
even when those harms were not caused intentionally. In an example presented in 
“Moral Luck,” Williams (1981) has us imagine a driver who, through no fault of his 
own—he was driving attentively, within the speed limit, etc.—fatally hits a child who 




death. It is not his fault, as it would have been had he been driving with murderous 
intent, or recklessly, or negligently, etc. The driver is like the bystander in this respect; 
neither is at fault for the death. Since the driver is faultless, he is intuitively blameless. 
For, given that the child’s death is not his fault, it is not something for which he can be 
morally responsible or, by extension, blameworthy. As such, the driver cannot be the 
fitting target of blaming responses like resentment or its reflexive counterpart, guilt. 
Causally responsible though the driver is, causal responsibility, as we all know, is 
insufficient for moral responsibility. 
But, claims Williams, we would expect the driver to have a response that differs 
essentially from the spectator’s, where this expectation is both predictive and 
normative. That is, firstly, it would be natural for the driver, but not the 
spectator, to experience a guilt-like attitude in virtue of his being the one who killed the 
child, and for the driver to be motivated thereby to personally make amends for the 
serious harm he caused (Williams 1981, 27).1 That is, it is natural for the driver to 
experience “agent-regret.” Though faultless, it is open to the driver but not the 
spectator to have the ethically non-trivial thought, “I killed him,” along with the wish 
that he had acted differently. Are these thoughts, however, not indicative of the 
driver’s uncertainty concerning his faultlessness? Might he not wonder whether he 
was, say, negligent in his driving, and so, blameworthy (to a degree) after all? Maybe, 
but as claims Williams, we would expect the response of agent-regret to remain even 
once such thoughts were, perhaps with the reassurance of others, put to rest. For, while 
the driver does not, let us grant, ultimately represent himself to have violated an 
obligation (or to be otherwise at fault), and so cannot resolve to do better vis-à-vis some 
obligation (at least not as a way of correcting his previous moral decision-making), the 
thought remains that he killed the child; the child died by his action. This thought pains 
and motivates him in a manner not ‘guilt-identical’ but guilt-like.2 
                                                        
1 Guilt’s motivational tendencies are typically taken to include the motivation to make amends and 
repair relations with the victim. See e.g. Lindsay-Hartz et al (1995); Leith & Baumeister (1998); Gilbert 
(2003, 1224). 
2 Difficult methodological questions concerning emotion-individuation are in the offing. For instance, 
how are we to determine whether cases like that of the faultless driver speak in favor of a) positing a 
novel kind of emotion, namely agent-regret, rather than b) expanding the formal object of guilt to 
somehow include faultlessly harmful actions? (See Jacobson (2013) for detailed discussion of this 
worry). The urgency of this kind of question is diminished by noting that Williams’s chief target in 
“Moral Luck” is the “morality system” (more on this below), according to which the driver’s response 
is irrational, regardless of how we classify the emotion. It is partly for this reason, and partly because 
Williams later claims that “[t]he agent-regret [he] described… can be psychologically and structurally a 
manifestation of guilt” (Williams 1993b, 92–93), that I doubt that Williams is wedded to the idea that 
“agent-regret” picks out a unique emotion-type. Unlike the elucidation of an overlooked and significant 
feature of moral experience, securing an adequate taxonomy of the emotions is not among Williams’s 
primary aims. Still, supposing that guilt is about faults and motivates correction of previous moral 
decision-making (or some other moral self-revision), I don’t think distinguishing between agent-regret 




It is not just that agent-regret is a natural response in that it is statistically likely 
in cases like those of the faultless driver. Agent-regret appears to be a rational response 
for the driver to have. The attitude somehow gets things, the normative things, right.3 
Differently put, it is intuitively fitting for the driver (but not the bystander) to feel this 
special attitude of agent-regret, where the ‘fittingness’ of an attitude amounts roughly 
to its being a correct way of representing that which the attitude is about (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000). (We will turn below to what it could be that agent-regret represents 
such that it represents correctly.) In addition to thinking that agent-regret is fitting for 
the driver, one might hold that there’s a sense in which the driver should have a 
response of agent-regret, such that there would be something criticizable in the 
driver’s response were he merely to occupy the regret of the bystander. My focus in 
what follows, though, is on agent-regret being appropriate in the sense of its being 
fitting for the driver to have. 
Williams and others (e.g. Baron 1988; Tannenbaum; 2007; Raz 2012) take agent-
regret to be fitting in cases like that of the faultless driver, where the fittingness of this 
response is explained by facts about agency, i.e. that it was the driver who, albeit 
without intending to do so, acted in such a way as to cause the relevant harm—i.e. that 
he was the agent. An underlying assumption here, sometimes briefly brought to the fore, 
is that one’s being the agent who causes some harm is normatively significant in virtue 
of the fact that one’s being a causal agent is a central component of who one is, practically 
speaking, i.e. of one’s practical identity (Williams 1981: 29; 1995, 32). But, if agent-regret 
is fitting, when it is, owing in part to causal agency being an expression of one’s 
practical identity, then we might expect different kinds of “faultless blows” to our 
practical identities to render fitting responses structurally similar to agent-regret. 
Responses of this sort, I propose, are sometimes ascribable to those personally related 
to agents who are responsible for serious harms, like genocidal war crimes and school 
shootings.  
                                                        
3 That is, although the presence of agent-regret provides us with evidence for thinking that a guilt-like 
response is fitting here, it is far from conclusive on its own. To illustrate, though survivor guilt may be 
statistically likely in certain conditions, it remains intuitively unfitting. Or rather, even if agent-regret 
and survivor-guilt are equally likely responses to their characteristic elicitors, we need not conclude 
these responses are on equal footing concerning fittingness. Survivor guilt might differ from agent-
regret in presupposing the truth of a thought that is natural to have, but which is false, e.g. that “I took 
another’s place by surviving; he died so that I could live.” Consider Primo Levi’s (VM, 254) description 
of survivor guilt as, in part, “the feeling of being alive in someone else’s stead.” (See Modell (1971, 340) 
for an explanation of survivor’ guilt that attributes to the survivor (implicit or unconscious) zero-sum 
thinking about the distribution of goods.) I am indebted to Szigeti (2015) in thinking of Williams’s 
argument (and my own) as emotion-guided (such that emotions guide us in providing defeasible 
evidence for normative conclusions) rather than emotion-based, such that “emotions are our highest 




When a person dear to oneself has caused another grievous harm, although one 
is not the agent of that harm, in virtue of one’s identifying with the agent (we’ll get to 
what this comes to), one is open to regretting the harm in a manner importantly 
distinct from the bystander. One may experience what I call “relation-regret,” a 
response that shares affective and motivational profiles with agent-regret. While our 
susceptibility to agent-regret reflects that “in the story of one’s life there is an authority 
exercised by what one has done, and not merely by what one has intentionally done” 
(Williams 1993b, 69), our susceptibility to relation-regret reflects that in the story of 
one’s life there is an authority exercised by what we have done—or alternatively, by 
what another-to-whom-I’m-bound has done—and not merely by what I have done.4  
If we accept relation-regret into our moral psychological repertoires, we acquire 
reason to accept a novel form of moral luck, i.e. associative luck. This is the luck of being 
vulnerable to morally reparative and guilt-like responses in virtue of one’s 
attachments to other persons. Given (or to the extent) that they are faultless, the 
grandson of the murderous war criminal and the parent of the school shooter are 
morally unlucky; the fittingness of their guilt-like responses depends in important 
respects on the harm caused by another’s actions, actions beyond the control of the 
relation-regretting person. Associative moral luck shares with its better-known cousin, 
resultant moral luck, an opposition to the “morality system” (Williams 1985, ch. 10), 
our modern moral outlook, which, fueled by an ideal of ultimate fairness (Williams 
1985: 195), ascribes supreme value to exercises of pure moral agency: voluntary actions 
performed in recognition of one’s moral obligations.5 Unlike much else in one’s life, 
exercises of pure moral agency are meant to be free from external influence and 
contingency, and as such, provide grounds for the kind of evaluation of agents that 
really matters: moral appraisal. The morality system’s insistence on the relative 
insignificance of the involuntary is challenged by attention to cases of resultant luck. 
Associative luck, I propose, challenges the morality system’s insistence that only one’s 
own expressions of agency are of ultimate importance for oneself. An individualistic 
ethical outlook is its target.6   
I proceed as follows: In section 2 I present in greater detail the phenomenon of 
agent-regret, illustrating the connection Williams and others identify between agent-
                                                        
4 As I discuss in sec. 3.3, though these formulations are non-equivalent, relation-regret can be 
characterized as a response either to ‘our’ doing (even when no joint action or group agency is implied), 
or to the doing of ‘another to whom I’m bound’.      
5 I return to this briefly in sec. 3, but for attentive treatment of the morality system, and discussion of its 
“building blocks,” which answer to generic human needs and can be understood as taking their 
particular, distorted, form in the morality system relative to the drive for ultimate fairness, see Queloz 
(this volume). 
6 The morality system’s individualism is implicit in its focus on the voluntary, for it is implied that a 




regret and resultant moral luck. In section 3 I introduce two cases of guilt-like 
responses about harms that are not the consequences of one’s own actions, but were 
instead perpetrated by members of one’s family. I label the relevant response relation-
regret, and propose that this first-personal response characteristically corresponds to 
responses of negative partiality on the part of the victims (and those personally related 
to them). After considering whether we may be vulnerable to relation-regret in virtue 
of our membership in larger groups, I argue in section 4 that those who take the 
existence of agent-regret to speak in favor of accepting resultant moral luck face 
pressure to accept a form of moral luck that is implied by relation-regret, namely 
associative luck. This is the luck of being vulnerable to pained moral responses in 
virtue of one’s attachment to other persons. Though potentially tragic in their 
implications, the conditions underlying relation-regret are the very same that, in other 
contexts, give considerable meaning to our lives. By appreciating the ways in which 
our practical identities are simultaneously social identities, doubt is cast on the 
desirability of rendering oneself immune to the pains of relation-regret. 
 
2. Agent-Regret and Resultant Moral Luck 
 
This section provides an overview of agent-regret, as introduced by Williams (1981) 
and further specified by others, and further outlines the connection between agent-
regret and resultant moral luck.7 Agent-regret is an emotional response that is defined 
by its constitutive thoughts and by its characteristic expression. Consider Williams’s 
example of the faultless truck driver who kills a child that darts onto the road. The 
driver is faultless in the sense that his fatally hitting the child is not explained by any 
moral shortcoming of his. He did not act in a way that constitutes a violation of a moral 
obligation, as he would have had he hit the child from malice, out of recklessness, or 
negligence. All precautions of a good driver were taken. Nevertheless, we think, 
claims Williams, that it would be fitting for the driver to have a pained response that 
differs from that of the bystander. While the driver and the bystander will both feel 
regret, in the sense of being pained that the child died and wishing things had 
happened otherwise, we expect the driver’s negative response to be about this event 
qua something he did. The driver’s regretful response is characterized by the wish that 
                                                        
7 I focus on a central form of luck-involving agent-regret, namely that directed toward the unintended 
and unforeseen consequences of one’s action. Another form of agent-regret plausibly characterizes the 
guilt-like response one might have for performing one of multiple seriously harmful or (pro tanto) 
wrong actions, among which the agent must choose. See Williams (1973, 172–173) and Baron (1988, 263–
264). I put aside also the issue of “conditional agent-regret” as raised by Williams’s examples of 




he had acted otherwise. Williams introduces the term “agent-regret” to refer to a species 
of regret that “a person can feel only toward his past actions'” (Williams 1981, 27). As 
Marcia Baron (1988, 261) puts it “[t]he pain that the driver feels about what happened 
is not just pain about that. He was centrally involved in what happened; indeed, he 
was the agent. That he was the agent, even though what he did was unintentional and 
even unforeseeable, is ineliminably a part of what he feels.” In being a pained reflexive 
attitude felt in response to the negative impact of one’s action on another, agent-regret 
is like guilt— it is guilt-like.8 
Agent-regret is also guilt-like in its expressive tendency, which involves the 
agent’s being motivated to personally make amends for the harm caused. This is a 
motivation not only to offer compensation, as one might if one merely took oneself to 
be legally liable for some injury. Rather, in regarding his harm-causing action 
“internally,” the agent of agent-regret is motivated to address and offer redress to the 
victims, such that, “(if he is lucky) his actions might have some reparative significance 
other than compensation” (Williams 1981, 29). While the bystander’s regret might 
move her to express sympathy and offer support to the victims, agent-regret includes 
a reparative desire, i.e., “a desire to make some sort of reparation” (Statman 1993, 6), “a 
desire to repair, to undo what one did or come as close to that as possible” (Raz 2012, 
139), a “desire to personally make amends” (Sussman 2018: 789). In its concern with 
victims and making amends personally, agent-regret is guilt-like. 
Williams’s discussion of agent-regret aims for more than descriptive adequacy. 
That is, in addition to predicting that agents like the truck driver will ordinarily 
respond with agent-regret, Williams takes this to be the appropriate response, such that 
it would be inappropriate for the driver to respond to the child’s death with regret no 
different from the bystander’s (Williams 1981, 28; 1993a, 256). Williams himself speaks 
of its being “rational” to respond with agent-regret in cases like the driver’s (Williams 
1981, 22, 29; 1993b, 92-3). In suggesting that the driver would be criticizable for failing 
to respond with agent-regret, Williams presumably means something quite strong by 
“rational” (e.g. “rationally required,” not just “rationally permissible,” though it’s 
doubtful Williams would put it thus). To focus our discussion, however, we can 
proceed with a more limited understanding of what it is for agent-regret to be 
                                                        
8 Williams (1981, 27, cf. 28, 29) emphasizes that agent-regret is first-personal not only in being about one’s 
own action (presumably also, represented in a de se mode of presentation, i.e. as mine), but further, 
regarded not “purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action,” but, as Williams implies, 
internally. Williams is quiet on the details here, but associates this internal view with the agent’s being 
motivated to personally make amends.  Presumably, however, the internal nature of agent-regret will be 
explanatorily prior to the kind of expression it motivates. By describing agent-regret as like guilt—the 
pangs-of-conscience of which are internal in a manner answering to the above characterization—I think 
we home in, however inadequately, on the relevant kind of “internality.” See Wojtowicz (2018) for 




appropriate, namely that agent-regret correctly represents its objects, i.e. is fitting 
(D’Arms & Jacobson 2000). 
But, given that the driver is not at fault (Williams 1981, 28), in virtue of what can 
his agent-regret be fitting? The skeptical worry here is that the guilt-like nature of 
agent-regret threatens to render the driver’s response unfitting. If agent-regret is too 
much like guilt, it will be difficult to understand as a response that does not somehow 
represent oneself as being at fault, in which case it will represent incorrectly, and so, 
be unfitting. The skeptic about agent-regret’s fittingness might provide a debunking 
explanation for the regular occurrence of agent-regret in such cases, e.g. by pointing to 
the practical stakes involved and to our epistemic limitations.9 While an omniscient 
being might know that the driver is faultless, perhaps the driver himself is unable to 
rule out that he is somehow at fault. Maybe, the driver might think, there were further 
precautions that he ought to have taken prior to driving. If the driver cannot rule these 
out, it may be that the driver is justified in doubting his faultlessness. If so, though his 
agent-regret will incorrectly represent, it will be understandable. Furthermore, we 
might think that although agent-regret is unfitting, it is nevertheless admirable or 
otherwise valuable for the driver (and others in similar high-stakes situations) to 
respond with agent-regret, feeling and acting responsible when their agency is implicated 
in serious harms (Wolf 2001, 13; Jacobson 2013, 114).10 
These worries are difficult to put to rest. Rather than attempting to do so directly, 
I turn to Williams’s answer to the question, in virtue of what is agent-regret fitting? 
Williams’s idea is that the products of our agency, even when they are involuntarily 
produced, have a special significance for us. While it is possible to understand 
Williams as claiming that it’s simply a brute fact that it’s fitting to respond with agent-
regret in cases like the driver’s, I think Williams’s view is richer here. In considering 
the possibility and rationality of divesting our psychologies of the disposition to 
respond with agent-regret in cases like the driver’s, Williams claims that this proposal 
betrays a “large falsehood: that we might, if we conducted ourselves clear-headedly 
enough, entirely detach ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions…and 
yet still retain our identity and character as agents” (Williams 1981, 29, italics added). I 
take Williams’s idea to be something like this: who one is, in the sense of one’s identity 
that matters to the meaningfulness of one’s life, surpasses the boundaries of one’s 
voluntary agency. I employ the term “practical identity” to refer to what Williams 
appears to have in mind in discussing “our identity and character as agents” (Williams 
                                                        
9 See e.g. Richards (1986, 171, 177); Thomson (1993, 205); Enoch & Marmor (2007, 415, 418) 
10 Additionally, we might think that a valuable social function is served by a practice whereby victims 




1981, 29).11 Williams appears to take there to be an important connection between a) 
having aims and ideals that constitute one’s practical identity, and b) one’s practical 
identity being expressed in, and sensitive to, far more than what one does voluntarily.12 
While Williams does not commit to there being a necessary connection between a) and 
b) (such that having a practical identity, all by itself, guarantees being concerned about 
the non-voluntary products of one’s agency), he says of the “mature agent” (Williams 
1995, 32) that this “agent lives with the truth that his character, what he is, is neither a 
deliberative construct of his, nor fully expressed in his deliberation. Indeed, he lives 
from that truth.” A promising way to understand this thought is that one’s practical 
identity sets for one various ideals and evaluative standards, which speak in favor of 
one’s making a material impact on the world in some particular ways (and against 
impacting the world in other ways), where one’s making thus an impact is irreducible 
to the impact one makes intentionally.   
This, at any rate, is roughly the view proposed (or implied) by several of those 
who follow Williams in taking the truck driver’s agent-regret to be fitting. That is, 
agent-regret is sometimes taken to be a fitting response to the driver’s own failure to 
live up to his values or ideals (e.g. Bagnoli 2000; Betzler 2000; Raz 2012; Tannenbaum 
2007; Wallace 2013). While the driver did not set out to do so, it is nevertheless true of 
him but not the bystander, that he killed the child. It will be understandable if his having 
done so, albeit non-voluntarily, conflicts with the values underlying his practical 
identity. As Joseph Raz writes, in discussing the truck driver, “the agent regrets having 
become, through the action, someone he would rather not be. The person who runs 
over a child, through no fault of his own, and kills him, becomes a killer, someone who 
killed a child, and he regrets that” (Raz 2012, 142). One’s practical identity is 
constituted in part by the ends one adopts, and one’s various agential achievements, 
but we can fall short of our values and ideals even when our falling short is not our 
fault. If we assume that these kinds of “non-voluntary things” can have ethical 
significance for one in virtue of the fact that they impact one’s practical identity, it may 
be intelligible that agent-regret is fittingly felt in cases like the truck driver’s.  
Suppose, with Williams and others, that agent-regret can be fitting in cases like 
the truck driver’s. This might appear to give us a troubling result. For, although agent-
regret is not identical to guilt, its guilt-like qualities (e.g. its motivating the agent to 
                                                        
11 Though this term is often associated with Korsgaard (1996), it should be clear that I do not take on 
board (or attribute to Williams) Korsgaard’s commitments concerning the relation between morality 
and practical identity (e.g. the fundamentality to rational agents’ practical identities of thinking of 
themselves as members of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’). I say more about what I mean by “practical identity” 
in 3.3. 
12 As Williams uses the term, one’s “character” is constituted in large part by one’s “set of desires, 




personally make amends) presumably qualify agent-regret for inclusion in the class of 
negative responses that are in the ballpark of blame. I label this broad class, blame-like 
responses, where this class includes guilt-like attitudes (e.g. agent regret), along with 
guilt and paradigmatic other-blaming responses (e.g. moral anger/resentment and 
indignation). To hold, with Williams, that we can be subject to blame-like responses 
on the basis of factors that are not voluntary expressions of our agency is to accept that 
we are vulnerable to moral luck. And, to accept that the truck driver’s (but not the 
bystander’s) agent-regret would be fitting is to accept a particular form of moral luck, 
resultant moral luck (Nagel 1979, 28), according to which the uncontrolled, and so 
“unlucky” results of one’s actions can render one the fitting object of blame-like 
responses. 
In the recent literature on moral luck, moral luck is often understood more 
narrowly, as the view that factors beyond one’s control partially determine whether, 
or the degree to which one is, blameworthy (and not just worthy of blame-like 
responses). This narrow view is sometimes referred to as the “[t]he Standard View of 
moral luck” (Hartman 2017, 23).13 While there may be good reasons to frame the issue 
of moral luck as concerning blameworthiness, it is worth noting that both Nagel and 
Williams understand the issue more broadly. In his discussion of moral luck, Nagel 
(1979) refers regularly to “moral judgment” and “moral assessment” (more so than to 
blameworthiness) as that which is sensitive to factors beyond agents’ control.14 
Moreover, if we adopt the narrow construal of moral luck, we get the result that 
Williams denies that the truck driver is subject to moral luck. After all, Williams’s point 
(or one of them) is that the driver is open to a certain kind of negative self-directed 
attitude (agent-regret) despite its being the case that spectators would not and should not 
blame him for killing the child (1981, 28). That is, Williams denies that the driver is 
narrowly blameworthy for running over the child. Does Williams, then, fail to “accept 
moral luck”? While Williams’s original use of the term “moral luck” was meant 
                                                        
13 Though the literature on moral luck has its 20th-century roots in Williams’s and Nagel’s Aristotelian 
Society symposium “Moral Luck” papers, it skews strongly Nagelian in being framed as a paradox 
arising from two compelling but incompatible intuitions, namely “the control condition” (i.e. the 
principle according to which one can be morally responsible only for that which is under one’s control), 
on the one hand, and on the other, the seemingly obvious relevance, in individual cases, of luck for 
judgments of moral responsibility. Indeed, several papers on moral luck written in the wake of the 
Williams/Nagel symposium are effectively responses to, as Richard (1986, 180) refers to the issue, 
“Nagel’s paradox” (see also Jensen 1984). For a similar point, see Lang (2019, 129-131). I thank Matt 
Talbert for raising this issue. 
14 Indeed, Hartman (2019, 144) attributes to Nagel a broader definition of moral luck, according to which 
uncontrolled factors can affect an agent’s “moral status.” As Hartman maintains, this broad view is too 
broad, as it can be endorsed by opponents of moral luck, e.g. those who claim lucky factors can affect the 
scope (but not degree) of one’s moral responsibility (Zimmerman 2002, 560). “Moral assessment,” 
however, a phrase Nagel employs regularly (unlike “moral status”), can plausibly be understood more 




oxymoronically (1993a, 251), in connecting agent-regret with the action-tendency of 
personally making amends, Williams takes agent-regret to be importantly like guilt in 
practical respects. In other words, Williams takes the truck driver to be open to blame-
like responses despite his faultlessness, and as such, to be subject to resultant luck.  
The above discussion of agent-regret and its connection to moral luck is not 
intended to convert nonbelievers, i.e. those opposed to the idea that agent-regret may 
be fitting, and that we are therefore subject to a kind of resultant moral luck. Or rather, 
its success in what follows does not depend on this kind of conversion. For, the 
argument that follows proceeds from accepting this idea about the connection between 
agent-regret and moral luck. I argue that by attending to the social nature of our 
practical identities, we can make sense of a blame-like response that is analogous to 
agent-regret, but which is directed not toward to the unintended consequences of one’s 




Something importantly like agent-regret can be had about actions that are not one’s 
own, but another’s, when that other is an agent with whom one identifies as a fellow 
group-member. A suitably restricted understanding of the relevant kind of 
“identification” will be necessary to make sense of this claim; stay tuned. In this section 
I try to make good on the previous claims by discussing two family-based examples of 
the target phenomenon, which I go on to call “relation-regret.” Next, I appeal to the 
social nature of our practical identities to locate fittingness conditions for relation-
regret. Finally, I consider membership in larger and more diffuse groups than those of 
family-membership (e.g. citizenship), with the goal of gauging the scope of relation-
regret’s possible objects. 
 
3.1 The case of Sue and Dylan Klebold 
 
Sue Klebold’s son, Dylan Klebold, was one of two students responsible for the 
Columbine High School massacre. Before the pair committed suicide, Dylan Klebold 
and his friend, Eric Harris, murdered 12 students and a teacher, injuring with gunshot 
wounds more than 20 others, some of whom would become paralyzed, and more still 
traumatized. In addition to its direct impact within the locale of Columbine, the 
shooting is regarded to have “set the blueprint for a generation of attacks” (Neklason 
2019). We can assume that Dylan Klebold (with Harris) is at fault and morally 




schoolmates and a teacher, and for seriously injuring many others.15 Dylan took part in 
the planning of the massacre, acquired and brought to school the weapons, and 
voluntarily and knowingly opened fire on a number of people who would thereby die 
or become seriously injured. Sue Klebold did none of these things, nor did she endorse 
Dylan in his plans. (Like much of the rest of the Columbine community, Sue was 
shocked to learn of the massacre and also shocked to learn of the identities of its 
perpetrators, though not because she was negligent in her parental duties—we will return 
to this). Ordinarily the truth of the claim “I didn’t do it” serves to undermine the 
claimant’s grounds for taking responsibility for it. But if Mrs. Klebold responded thus 
regarding her son’s actions, this would be perceived, at best, as beside the point, and 
more likely, as a way of evading what it is for her to be the shooter’s parent. Or, at 
least, a special kind of regret seems open to her in virtue of her being the parent of a 
shooter. 
The above will seem obvious if we assume, as it may be difficult not to, that Sue 
bears some fault for the massacre; surely she must have known— or should have known—
what her son was up to. While it is possible that Sue is indirectly at fault, e.g. for the 
way she raised Dylan, or for failing to be sufficiently attentive in the period leading up 
to the shooting, etc. this is neither entailed by her son’s conduct, nor is it probable 
given the evidence.16 It is an illusion to think that the crime of the child 
is always traceable to a blameworthy act or omission by the parent or caregiver. Sue 
Klebold seems not to have been a negligent parent. By all accounts, she appears to have 
been a loving and caring mother to her children. But as Sue writes in her memoir, A 
Mother’s Reckoning, “[a]s bottomless as my love had been, it had not been enough to 
save Dylan, or his victims” (Klebold 2016, 268). For the time being, grant that Sue is 
indeed not morally at fault, even indirectly, for the shooting. (I address the worry 
shortly that Sue’s causal contribution to the massacre might suffice to explain the 
phenomenon at hand—it cannot.) 
Though she recognizes that she is not at fault for the massacre, Sue 
reports feeling guilt for her son’s actions. “In the days after Columbine,” she writes, “I 
filled notebook after notebook with words in an effort to process my confusion and 
guilt and grief” (Klebold 2016, 19). While Sue does not take herself to be at fault, neither 
does she disavow her self-punitive attitudes. Furthermore, Sue states that among the 
                                                        
15 If the reader doubts this on the grounds that Dylan was aged 17 at the time of the shooting (while 
Harris was 18), we can modify the case such that, by stipulation, the shooting takes place 5 months later, 
and Dylan is indeed 18. We can also stipulate for our purposes that Dylan Klebold was not morally 
incompetent, e.g. a psychopath.   
16 “Investigators… concluded that both sets of parents were ‘normal people who seem to care for their 
children and were involved in their life,’ and they too ‘were fooled like everyone else.’” (Gibbs & Roche 




reasons for writing her memoir was the desire to apologize to the victims of her son’s 
actions: 
 
I wanted to apologize to the families in person at the depositions, but our 
lawyers didn’t agree. “This isn’t the time or place,” I was told. I wish I had 
fought harder to say those words. I believe their absence was deeply felt by 
everyone in the room, and continues to be, to this day. Saying I am 
profoundly sorry is one of the reasons I wanted to write this book.            
(Klebold 2016, 279) 
 
 While guilt-like feelings, together with the desire to apologize, would be unfitting (if 
even intelligible) for uninvolved parties, Sue’s being the shooter’s parent—where 
parenthood is understood as more than a biological relation (more on this soon)—
might strike us as normatively significant in a way that renders intelligible this kind 
of response. More strongly, although Sue is not at fault for the harms caused by Dylan, 
there would be something manifestly deficient in Sue’s response if it was, say, limited 
to grief over the loss of her son. Sue’s memoir abounds with expressions of grief over 
the loss of her son, e.g. “we all grieve first the ones we love, and Dylan was my son”; 
“[m]y grief for Dylan was at the heart of everything” (Klebold 2016, 42, 75). But, if her 
pained responses to the shooting were limited to those of the sort had by the victims 
and their families—responses like grief and regret (in the sense of wishing things were 
otherwise)—Sue would seem to be incorrectly appraising the normative landscape.17 
For, even if Dylan’s actions are not her fault, this fact would seem not to undermine 
the rationality of her guilt-like responses, given that Dylan is her son. Although she is 
not their author, the harms are in some sense hers, in a way they cannot be for the 
spectator. 
 One sign of Sue’s appreciation of the normative significance of her relation to 
the shooting is found in the reparative significance of Sue’s interactions with family 
members of her son’s victims: 
 
We have had some contact with a few of the victims’ family members over 
the years, and I believe it was healing, for both parties. The father of a boy 
who died reached out to us about a year after the tragedy. We invited him 
to our home in December 2001. I was stunned by his generosity of spirit 
and found great relief in being able to apologize to him in person for 
Dylan’s actions, and to express our sorrow for his terrible loss. We wept, 
                                                        
17 See Hutchison (2019) for discussion of parents who subsequently apologized for having conveyed 
responses of grief to the exclusion of (something like) relation-regret for the massacre-suicide of their 




shared photos, and talked about our children. When we parted, he said he 
didn’t hold us responsible. They were the most blessed words I could have 
hoped to hear him say.          (Klebold 2016, 277) 
 
 It may be that in saying that he does not hold Sue responsible, the father thereby 
provides Sue with reason to believe (or to strengthen her belief) that she is not culpable 
for Dylan’s actions.18 Perhaps this is part of why Sue takes such great comfort in the 
father’s words. But Sue describes interactions like those above not as “elucidating,” 
say, but “healing, for both parties.” More importantly, even if part of the value for Sue 
of the above kind of interaction was evidentiary, Sue’s memoir is written as an apology 
to the victims despite its being written from a position of justifiably believing, and 
presumably knowing, that Sue is not at fault (by hypothesis, partly on the basis of 
social feedback from family members of the victims). This, together with Sue’s 
insistence that she was a caring and responsible mother to Dylan, suggests that the 
enduring guilt-like response that motivate Sue to make amends, are not ones that, at 
their core, involve Sue’s taking herself to be at fault. 
For all this, it may be difficult to separate Sue’s guilt-like response from her 
being a causal contributor to her son’s harmful actions. After all, had she not had 
children, Dylan Klebold could not have jointly orchestrated and carried out the 
shooting. Had she not enrolled Dylan in Columbine High School, it is highly unlikely 
that the massacre would have taken place. More proximately, had she somehow 
intervened the morning of, or in the days leading up to, April 20, 1999, as it was 
presumably in her causal power to do, it is imaginable that the massacre could have 
been prevented. We might also postulate that a more attentive parent would have noticed 
“the signs.” This may well be true. Sue effectively admits as much in writing that she 
“missed subtle signs of psychological deterioration that, had [she] noticed, might have 
made a difference for Dylan and his victims—all the difference in the world” (Klebold 
2016, 18). But, to say that there is something (laudable) that one could have done to 
prevent some tragedy is not to say that one is blameworthy for failing to prevent it, as 
this kind of omission is compatible with faultlessness. (The faultless truck driver, after 
all, might correctly judge that, had he trained to be a NASCAR driver, he could have 
avoided hitting the child.) As Sue maintains, she and her husband had been “loving, 
attentive, and engaged parents” (Klebold 2016, 17). Still, to the extent that Sue’s guilt-
like response involves viewing the massacre as causally dependent on her agency, 
such that it was in her power to prevent it, her painful response may be construed as 
                                                        




one of agent-regret.19 To better see why Sue’s guilt-like response cannot—or at least, 
rationally need not—be solely one of agent-regret, we need to turn to a different kind 
of example.  
 
3.2 The case of Rainer and Rudolf Hoess 
 
In the documentary, Hitler’s Children, Chanoch Ze’evi interviews the descendants of 
several Nazi war criminals, including the grandson of Rudolf Hoess. Rudolf Hoess 
was the commandant of the Auschwitz death camp, to which he introduced the 
procedure of killing prisoners at an industrial scale through the use of Zyklon-B. He is 
to blame for exterminating some 2.5 million people. Rainer Hoess, Rudolf Hoess’s 
grandson does not figure in the causal explanation of Rudolf Hoess’s killings. They 
occurred well before Rainer was born. Rudolf Hoess was executed 18 years before 
Rainer Hoess’s birth. For this reason, agent-regret is not an attitude available to Rainer 
Hoess without serious delusion. And yet, Rainer Hoess reports feeling self-punitive 
attitudes like guilt and shame for his grandfather’s actions: “[i]t’s hard to explain the 
guilt… I carry the guilt with me in my mind. I am ashamed too, of course, over what 
my family, my grandfather, did to thousands of other families.” Rainer’s guilt-like 
response is like Sue’s in being about a serious harm that somehow belongs to him, but 
not as something he has done.20 
Like Sue, Rainer engages in what are intuitively understood as reparatively 
significant interactions with relatives of the victims of the harms wrought by his 
family. In Ze’evi’s documentary, Rainer visits Auschwitz, where he is introduced to, 
and addresses, a group of Israeli students and other visitors. One student asks whether 
he feels guilty for what his grandfather did, to which Rainer Hoess replies, “yes.” In 
distressed tears, another student tells Rainer that his grandfather tortured and 
exterminated her family; she then addresses the group thus: “isn’t he afraid of these 
encounters with us?” Later, a Holocaust survivor named Zvika, who was present 
throughout, asks whether he may shake Rainer Hoess’s hand. The two embrace, and 
                                                        
19 See Williams’s (1981, 28) point about the person in the passenger side of the truck, who may take on 
an agent’s thought, thinking how he might have prevented the accident, despite not being the agent of 
the harm.  
20 Might Rainer’s response not be explained in part by anxieties related to thoughts like “that could have 
been me!” or “there but for the grace of God go I”? It is difficult to imagine that Rainer’s reflections on 
his family history would exclude thoughts like these. These kinds of anxieties, however, seem apt to 
instill humility in Rainer and something like pity toward his grandfather. But when asked by a group 
of Israeli students what Rainer would do were he confronted with his grandfather, Rainer says he would 
kill his grandfather himself. This, of course, does not undermine the possibility that Rainer does feel 
these anxieties; if he is being sincere in his avowed blame of his grandfather, his stance may instead be 




upon being addressed by Zvika as follows: “I was there… You weren’t there. You 
didn’t do it. You didn’t do it,” the previously outwardly emotionless Rainer breaks 
into tears. Discussing the impact for him of the interaction with Zvika, Rainer says that 
“[f]or the first time, you don’t feel fear or shame, but happiness, joy, inner joy, to 
receive the approval of someone who survived these horrors, and knows for sure that 
it wasn’t you, that you didn’t do it.” Of course, Rainer was not previously in doubt 
regarding his contribution to the Holocaust. He knows, and knew, that it took place 
prior to his birth, and so, that he could not have performed, or otherwise contributed to, 
the mass killings. It is also implausible that he was previously in doubt regarding 
others’ knowledge of his non-contribution to the killings. Neither party comes to learn 
something about whether Rainer Hoess was culpable for his grandfather’s actions. The 
interaction’s significance, rather, is practical. In particular, it is reparative in nature.21  
While there are important differences between the Hoess and Klebold cases, 
they have the following in common. They feature a) an individual experiencing a guilt-
like attitude about harms for which they are not, and do not take themselves to be, at 
fault. Second, b) the guilt-like attitude motivates one to personally make amends for 
the harm. Thirdly, c) in virtue of their relation to the harm, the guilt-like response is 
intuitively rationally available to them in a way that it is not available to the mere 
bystander. Now, a)–c) are true too of agent-regret. But the shared features of Rainer’s 
and Sue’s responses cannot be explained with the conceptual apparatus of agent-
regret; it is not qua agent-who-caused-the-harm that they experience the anguished (a-
c) response.  
 
3.3 Relation-Regret & Practical Identity 
 
I propose that Rainer’s and Sue’s guilt-like responses are usefully conceptualized as 
instances of relation-regret. Relation-regret is an anguished response to harm caused by 
a person to whom one is intimately related, as a co-member of a group partly 
constitutive of one’s practical identity (e.g. one’s family). Both Sue and Rainer can say 
the following of the object of their regret: it is something my family did. I understand 
“family” here as a normative category irreducible to biological kinship. The relevant 
sense in which Rainer is and views himself to be a Hoess—a member of the Hoess 
                                                        
21 The extent of its reparative significance, however, should not be exaggerated. Consider the comment 
of a third-generation Holocaust survivor, who accompanies Rainer to Auschwitz: “It must have made 
them [the Israeli students visiting Auschwitz] feel really good that he was there, to see him, to hear him. 
For them, it closes a very small circle, totally disproportionate to the circle of Holocaust survivors. But 
it offers them a happy ending at the end of this terrible journey… I didn’t feel any connection to it. I 
didn’t feel connected to it because it all seemed too quick. It seemed like it lacked depth. It was genuine. 




family— is presumably not one that would easily survive Rainer’s having been 
adopted in infancy and raised by individuals unconnected to the Holocaust. While I 
do not attempt to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for the relevant kind 
of family membership, in Rainer’s case, being raised by and formed in light of the 
values of a person who himself was raised by and formed in light of the values of 
Rudolf Hoess (i.e. Rudolf Hoess’s son), will be part of what gives substance to Rainer’s 
identifying with Rudolf Hoess qua family member.22 The sense in which Rainer Hoess 
identifies with Rudolf Hoess is, we can stipulate, that secured by its being a significant 
feature of Rainer’s practical identity that he is a member of the Hoess family. 
 By “identifying with,” I mean something more substantive than mentally 
classifying oneself as having some feature in common with others. Even if there is a 
sense in which I can, right now, have a thought that makes it the case that I “identify 
with” some group (say, green-eyed persons), the sense of identification of interest to 
me is not this, but that specified by talk of one’s “practical identity.”  
As I employ the term, one’s practical identity is constituted by one’s   
a) subsumption under 
and  
b) self-application of 
normatively significant (for the self in question) categories.  
While a) and b) may not be easily separable in many cases, they are conceptually 
distinct. I take “subsumption” to be a (social) metaphysical notion. For one to be 
subsumed under a normatively significant category C is for one to be a member of the 
C-class. Supposing “vegan” (understood as ‘one whose diet excludes animal 
products’) to be such a category, there will be a fact of the matter, independently of 
one’s self-categorization, whether one is a vegan. If I eat bacon every morning, though 
I may aspire to be a vegan, no amount of self-application of the category, however 
sincere, will suffice to make it so, i.e. to make ‘being vegan’ part of my practical 
identity. Importantly, the application-conditions for many identity-relevant categories 
will depend on historically, geographically, culturally (etc.) contingent practices. Not 
all circumstances will allow that one’s practical identity can include being, say, an 
abolitionist or a first amendment activist. Additionally, one’s historical circumstances 
sometimes play an essential role in fixing the extension of a given category, such that 
one’s being subsumed under that category at one point is history does not guarantee 
subsumption at a later time. Nevertheless, there will ordinarily be a (social) fact of the 
                                                        
22 I owe the thoughts of the latter half of this paragraph to Matt Talbert, who also suggests that kinship 




matter whether some individual belongs to the class in question (or is perhaps a 
‘borderline case’).23 How such facts are determined, I leave to the social metaphysicians. 
Next, “self-application” is a psychological matter. It refers to one’s regarding 
oneself as falling under some normative category. Self-application will involve more 
than merely believing that some category applies to oneself, however. For, identity-
constituting categories come with identity-given reasons and evaluative standards, 
which reasons and standards animate one’s identity-specific deliberations, 
motivations, and evaluations. Often self-application is implicit, but it can be made 
explicit, e.g. when one interacts with others who do not share the relevant practical 
identity-given perspective. For example, when Malik declines a lunch invitation, citing 
as his reason that, “I am Muslim and will be fasting for Ramadan”, Malik’s self-
application of the category “Muslim” and its normative force for him, is made explicit. 
In other contexts, self-application might not be reflected in self-conscious thought. The 
Buddhist monk will be disposed to reason and behave in ways expressive of his 
identity as a monk—many of his deliberations and evaluations will be performed from 
the perspective of this practical identity—but the conditions of his monasticism 
(including his being in the company of other monks, exclusively) might preclude the 
need to make explicit the identity-given nature of the reasons on which he typically 
acts, or to justify himself to others in terms of his being a monk.  
Though one’s practical identity will typically also include categories that are 
not governed by group-specific norms (e.g. those rooted in one’s individual 
commitments or one’s personality), the above discussion suggests that our practical 
identities are often constituted in part by our group memberships, i.e. our social 
identities (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Hogg & Turner 1987; Oakes et al 1991; Turner et al 
1987; Brewer 1991). It is natural to assume that for both Sue and Rainer, being a Klebold 
and Hoess, respectively, is part of their practical identities. Sue and Rainer both are 
members of their respective families, where family-membership is a normative notion 
implying, inter alia, the sharing of history and customs. 
The payoff of this excursus on practical identity is within reach. In the previous 
section, the fittingness of agent-regret was accounted for by the assumption that 
involuntary products of one’s agency can negatively impact one’s practical identity, 
changing one’s identity-given reasons. The products of one’s agency are poised to 
affect one’s practical identity—who one is, and so, what one has reason to do—even 
when those products are not voluntarily brought about. Recall Williams’s skepticism 
                                                        
23 I say “ordinarily” to accommodate the possibility of circumstances in which the social/historical 
conditions are such that there is no fact of the matter whether some individual falls under a given 
category; see Hacking (1999; 2002). For an overview of positions on social kinds, see Ásta (2017) and for 




that we can sever from our practical identities the impact of our actions and their 
unintended consequences on the world (Williams 1981, 29; cf. Bagnoli 2000; Betzler 
2000; Honoré 1999, 75; Raz 2012; Statman 1993, 6; Tannenbaum 2007; Wallace 2013). In 
the case of the faultless driver, being the killer of an innocent child may conflict with 
the values of one’s practical identity. This conflict does not imply that one intentionally 
killed the child, or that the killing was one’s fault. One’s practical identity—qua 
causally efficacious agent—renders one vulnerable to the anguish involved in being a 
killer, an agent who has killed another, albeit unintentionally.   
Analogously, in cases of relation-regret, a social feature of one’s practical 
identity—particularly, one’s family-membership (understood as more than kinship)—
stands to explain why guilt-like responses are fitting in response to grievous harms 
caused by members of our families. The failures of a family member might be 
affectively and motivationally registered by a fellow member as our failure (Salice & 
Montes Sanchez 2016).24 I hasten to add that I do not assume that relation-regret must 
represent the harm caused as something “we” (e.g. “our family”) did. Though such 
‘we’ thoughts strike me as coherent even in cases like Rainer’s, where nothing like joint 
action or complicity is implied, the phenomenology of relation-regret might be better 
captured by reference to possessive thoughts reflecting group membership, rather 
than plural reflexive thoughts—i.e. what ‘my son’, or ‘my grandfather’ did (rather than 
what ‘my family’ did, though without my involvement). The group-relation might 
figure as a background condition for relation-regret, rather than featuring in its 
contents. 
If agent-regret reflects the vulnerability of one’s practical identity to the 
uncontrolled outcomes of one’s agency, relation-regret reflects the vulnerability of 
one’s practical identity to the actions of those to whom we are bound in robust forms 
of group co-membership. In particular, relation-regret is reflective of damage done to 
a social component of one’s practical identity. 
Consider Sue Klebold’s self-assessment as a “mother”. “Before the shootings,” 
Sue says, “I thought of myself as a good mom; helping my children become caring, 
healthy, responsible adults was the most important role in my life. But the tragedy 
convinced me that I failed as a parent.”25 As with agent-regret, there is room for self-
punitive excess in feeling relation-regret. Perhaps Sue is being too hard on herself. But, 
perhaps not. For, Sue appreciates that there is a sense in which she is not a bad 
                                                        
24 Developmental studies by Over et al. (2016, 29; cf. Bennett & Sani 2008) suggest that children as young 
as five are prone to “accept responsibility for the negative actions of their ingroup members,” 
manifesting embarrassment and guilt-like reactions and taking steps towards remedying transgressions 
performed by ingroup members of their ingroup. For discussion of the mental representations 
underlying group identification, see Salice & Miyazono (2019). 




mother—after all, she describes herself and her husband as “loving, attentive, and 
engaged parents” (Klebold 2016: 17). And, she might conceivably and coherently be 
proud of, and affirm, certain aspects of her motherhood. Still, should we assume that 
she is mistaken in taking her son’s actions to be incompatible with affirming herself to 
be, in the full sense of the term, a good mother? If we grant that there is more to being 
a good parent than good parenting, such that the latter but not the former is compatible 
with the thought that one “was the person who had raised a ‘monster’” (Klebold 2009), 
we can make sense of the claim that, despite her sound parenting, Sue “failed as a 
parent”.26 Naturally, this thought gives Sue reason for a special kind of pained 
response—one distinct from the attitude you or I might take toward Dylan Klebold’s 
actions.   
One might worry whether it can be sufficient for either agent-regret or relation-
regret that the regretted actions impact one’s practical identity. For, diminishments to 
one’s practical identity might understandably render shame fitting, but being ashamed 
about X does not obviously provide one with reasons to personally make amends for 
X. Personally making amends and seeking forgiveness (or something like it) are 
motivations associated not with shame, but guilt. A second step appears necessary to 
justify the guilt-like nature of relation-regret (and agent-regret, though I’ll focus on the 
former for now), namely the need to address interpersonal antagonisms. The reparative 
significance of an expression of relation-regret is intelligible only in light of this kind 
of need.27 We needn’t look beyond practical identity, however, to accommodate this 
point. That is, a fuller understanding of practical identity generally, and the dynamics 
of group-membership, in particular, sheds light on the normativity of the antagonisms 
at play. 
A feature of social cognition is our tendency to (implicitly) categorize others as 
either one of ‘us’ or one of ‘them’, i.e. to view persons as belonging either to one’s 
ingroup or outgroup (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al 1971; Kramer & Brewer 1984). In cases of 
interpersonal conflict, it is natural for ingroup/outgroup categorization to intensify in 
salience (Taylor & Jaggi 1974; Dovidio et al 1997). Next, other things being equal, 
reasons of partiality presumably count in favor of, and so will ground others’ 
expectations that, related agents will somehow support their harm-causing relatives. 
That is, it is commonly held that we are sometimes justified in giving (limited) 
preferential treatment to those ‘near and dear’. That some person is my daughter, say, 
                                                        
26 Part of the explanation for this may be that Sue was still in the process of parenting; Dylan lived at 
home, and the project of raising him was yet incomplete. Thanks to Matt Talbert for this point. 
27 Here I draw on David Sussman’s (2018) recent discussion of agent-regret. As Sussman (2018, 802) 
writes, “even when there is no culpability, there can still be inescapable forms of personal antagonism 




intuitively gives me a special reason to promote that person’s welfare. In light of the 
related but faultless agent’s reasons for partiality toward her harm-causing relation, 
then, the victims of the harm seem prima facie justified in extending their hostile stance 
toward the wrongdoer to those plausibly construed as being on the same side as the 
harm-causer.28 Recall the Israeli student’s question about Rainer Hoess, to her group: 
isn’t he afraid of these encounters with us? While Rainer is not in fact, as his grandfather 
was, hatefully disposed toward people of Jewish origin, he is nonetheless defeasibly 
seen as such—as an enemy— owing to his shared family identity with Rudolf Hoess.29 
If group-membership consists in part in the sharing of history and giving special 
attention to the interests of ingroup members, it may be reasonable for outgroup 
members to view those related to the wrongdoer as defeasibly supportive of— and 
more importantly (and to be further unpacked below) normatively implicated in— the 
harm caused, despite being recognized as personally faultless. 
Support for this idea is found in Sue Klebold’s acknowledgement that her son’s 
actions generate antagonistic relations between herself and Dylan’s victims. Speaking 
of “the sorrow [Dylan] had caused another mother” Sue (2016, 61) writes, “I wanted 
to feel close to her, and I did, but I was the last person on earth she would allow to 
offer her words of comfort, and the sense of isolation and grief and guilt following so 
quickly on the heels of that sense of connection devastated me.” Despite feeling 
compassion towards the victims, Sue is separated from them by an antagonistic rift 
created by her son (and to that extent, by her family). The reasons of partiality she had 
toward her son, plausibly translate into reasons she has to make amends for what he 
has done.30 Recall that Sue writes her memoir not to ‘clear her name’, but rather to 
personally make amends for her son’s actions. While this involves taking a stand 
against Dylan’s actions, thereby providing others with evidence that she does not 
share her son’s values, this kind of evidence might be conveyed while refusing to make 
amends.  
Importantly, on the “practical identity view” here advanced, Sue’s reasons for 
making amends are not dependent on her having performed an act of taking 
responsibility for Dylan’s actions. The practical identity view is to be contrasted with 
volitional views of the fit-making conditions for responsibility-responses like those I 
attribute to Sue and Rainer. Consider the view proposed by David Enoch (2012), 
according to which an agent might “take responsibility” (in response to a duty to do 
                                                        
28 An upshot of this point is plausibly that group members are specially positioned to address co-
members with directives to act in accordance with norms endorsed by the group, so as to prospectively 
limit intergroup antagonism. See Story (2019, esp. 611-13) for a way of developing this point. 
29 On the antagonistic counterpart to partiality (or, “negative partiality”), see Brandt (2020). 
30 See Scheffler (2010, 50-2) on the “membership-dependent” and “relationship-dependent” reasons 




so) for another’s actions, through a “kind of (possibly mental) action” (Enoch 2012, 
102), thereby licensing responsibility-responses for those actions. On my view, by 
contrast, one’s group memberships themselves—understood, again, as robust valuing 
relations figuring in one’s practical identity— render fitting responses like relation-
regret (well, together with the harm caused by a fellow group-member). The holding 
of further background conditions might also be necessary for relation-regret (perhaps 
the agent in question must possess certain agential capacities, ones possibly absent in 
children, say), but the point here is that, for the relevant class of agents whose practical 
identities are constituted in part by their group-memberships, no act of taking 
responsibility is necessary to render fitting the response of relation-regret.31 
The cases I have focused on are ones involving relation-regret for serious harms 
caused by a member of one’s family. As family-membership is often a form of group-
membership wherein group members view one another as i) interdependent and ii) 
sharing an identity (see Lickel et al. 2005), relation-regret may be especially 
pronounced among family-members. But, might not relation-regret be felt about 
harms caused by agents with whom we identify on different, non-familial, grounds? 
We belong to groups beyond that of the family, e.g. that of one’s country, nation, 
religion, ethnicity, etc. It is natural to wonder whether the above discussion of relation-
regret extends to cases where the harm-causing agent is related to one qua member of 
some such group. If some of my fellow citizens, say, are responsible for grave acts of 
injustice against the people of another country, can it be fitting for me to feel relation-
regret for their actions? A positive answer to this question will depend in part on a 
positive answer to the question, “is my membership in this group (my citizenship, 
                                                        
31 Still, Enoch and I share the view that agent-regret and relation-regret are to be treated in a similar 
fashion. Additionally, despite the letter of his view, Enoch allows considerable work to be done by non-
voluntary responses. That is, Enoch claims that one can implicitly “take responsibility” for acts that are 
not one’s fault. One might, for example, take responsibility for the unjust actions of one’s country by 
having felt proud of its achievements at an earlier time (Enoch 2012, 111, 127). This sounds to me as 
coming quite close to the view that one’s group-membership— understood not as mere citizenship (e.g. 
being a passport-holder), but as normative category reflected in one’s practical identity—does the work 
of securing the fittingness of, in my terms, relation-regret. That is, once Enoch introduces what it means 
to implicitly take responsibility, it looks like one’s group-membership itself is what renders these 
responses fitting, and not anything resembling a voluntary response to a duty. Enoch grants (in 
conversation) that he is susceptible to this kind of worry, and suggests a way of getting more volitional 
control into his view. The idea is roughly that the involuntary responses in virtue of which one ‘takes 
responsibility’ are capable of being rationally approved or endorsed by their subjects. While one might 
e.g. grow up unreflectively supporting some group, feeling pride and the like for its achievements, one 
might later reflectively endorse one’s support of that group, thereby making the support one’s own. For 
development of this idea in another context, see Enoch (2020). If, though, it turns out that the capacity 
for such endorsement is what matters (as I suggest above), this kind of point may speak more in favor 
of a practical identity-based view, than a volitional one. Alternatively, if the volitional view can be 
reformulated such that its focus is on (something like) autonomy rather than autonomous acts of will per 
se, the gap might be bridged between the practical identity view and volitional (/autonomy) views. But, 




robustly understood) a feature of my practical identity?” Recall that this requires not 
only that one self-applies the category (of e.g. American citizen), but that one is 
subsumed under this category, such that one is beholden to the norms constitutive of 
citizenship. Finally, we will need to know whether citizenship can be a normatively 
significant category, at least for some of those for whom their being citizens is a feature 
of their practical identity. I see no reason to deny any of this outright, and so, no reason 
to deny that one might fittingly feel relation-regret for harms caused by one’s fellow 
citizens (or by one’s fellows qua members of larger groups still).32  
  Before turning to the connection between relation-regret and moral luck, a 
comment is in order about the optionality of our memberships in (at least) a wide range 
of groups of which we are a part. Persons of course join groups, and leave groups. 
More generally, the social elements of our practical identities are not simply foisted 
upon us, but partly of our own making. Shouldn’t it be possible, then, for an agent to 
exit some group at her choosing, e.g. upon learning that some of its members have 
committed serious injustices? The short answer, as I see it, is: sometimes, but not 
instantaneously and not without costs. Suppose one has reason to feel relation-regret on 
the basis of one’s citizenship (i.e. one’s membership to some country as reflected in 
one’s practical identity). Now, in some cases one might be able to relinquish one’s 
citizenship and leave one’s homeland. Suppose this is done in an effort to divest 
oneself of membership in some state. Will this suffice for extirpating membership in 
that group from one’s practical identity? Perhaps (or perhaps it will be a start), but 
depending on the details, we might be inclined to view a process of renunciation like 
this—painful in some respects as it is apt to be, assuming that citizenship in that land 
was a part of one’s practical identity—as a way of manifesting one’s relation-regret, 
rather than evading it. Whether it’s a commendable (or even permissible) way of 
manifesting one’s relation-regret is another, first-order moral, question. 
                                                        
32 Still, it may be dialectically preferable to focus on relation-regret had along familial lines, at least as a 
way of introducing the phenomenon of relation-regret. One reason has to do with group size; groups 
unified along lines of citizenship tend to be quite large. If we assume that the emotional and reparative 
burdens proper to relation-regret are distributed amongst members of the group— and that the size of 
any member’s reparative burden qua group member may vary in proportion to factors like the 
significance of that group to one’s practical identity— country-based cases of relation-regret may tend 
to generate reasons for personally making amends that are easily defeated or fairly limited. (I put this 
thought forward speculatively; a host of complications are packed into it). A version of this point may 
also to apply to family-based relation-regret in cases where one is distantly related to the wrongdoer. 
I’m not sure what will count as sufficient distance, but the normative grounds for Rainer Hoess to feel 
relation-regret for his grandfather’s actions will intuitively be considerably stronger than those for 
Rainer’s great-granddaughter to feel relation-regret for Rudolf Hoess’s actions. To be sure, this may be 
explained not only by familial distance, but by the contingent fact that others (like Rainer Hoess) will 
already have done some of the reparative work called for by her great-great-great-grandfather’s actions. 
The distance of the victims’ relatives to the original victims might also be partly explanatory of this 




Returning to familial relations, while there may be a real sense in which a parent 
can “disown” their child, the commitments ordinarily undertaken in parenting are 
such as to cast doubt on the idea that one can, through a sheer act of will, opt out of 
being a parent, thereby rendering oneself normatively invulnerable to the impact on 
the world of the persons one raised and cared for. As Samuel Scheffler (1997, 204) puts 
a related thought, “the idea that the significance of our personal ties and social 
affiliations is wholly dependent on our wills—that we are the supreme gatekeepers to 
our identities—can only be regarded as a fantasy.” For Sue Klebold, the prospect of 
somehow cutting ties with Dylan does not arise as an option, in part because she still 
loves him, as expressed in her grief. In short, though we regularly undertake activities 
toward shaping our practical identities—and may, in a real sense, form ourselves— 
this means neither that it is possible nor desirable for us to simply sever group-
memberships from our practical identities when doing so would be, from a narrowly 
self-interested perspective, convenient. 
 
4. From Relation-Regret to Associative Luck 
 
If the interpersonal damage wrought by those to whom we are intimately related can 
provide us with reasons for guilt-like and reparative responses, it appears that we are 
vulnerable to a kind of moral luck owing to the way in which our practical identities 
bind us to others.33 I introduce the label associative luck to refer to this phenomenon. To 
the extent that Sue Klebold and Rainer Hoess have reasons to feel and express the guilt-
like attitude of relation-regret—reasons grounded not in any expression of their own 
agency but rather in the agency of another to whom they are related—they are 
associatively unlucky.34 
I have avoided claiming that those who fittingly feel relation-regret for X are in 
a sense morally responsible for X. For, I accept that a central kind of moral responsibility 
is that implying fault (or, in the positive case, credit) for the object of moral 
responsibility. Since Rainer and Sue are faultless for the objects of their relation-regret, 
these agents will not be morally responsible in the central, fault-implying, sense. ‘Moral 
                                                        
33 At least, if we refrain from understanding moral luck narrowly; see the penultimate paragraph of 
section 2. 
34This does not mean that that they are unlucky to be related to those to whom they are related (/to be part 
of the family of which they are a part). After all, the resultantly unlucky agent’s agent-regret does not 
imply that he is unlucky to be an agent. Admittedly, we can imagine cases for which it would be sensible 
to claim that one is unlucky in being related to some family-member (though this might unintelligible 
in cases where one’s being in that relation is essential to who one is, e.g. one’s having the (grand)parents 
one has). But even when this kind of claim would be intelligible, the point remains that it is compatible 
with one’s experiencing relation-regret (and being to that extent associatively unlucky) that one affirms 




responsibility,’ however, is a multiply ambiguous term, and as long as we 
disambiguate and proceed with due caution, we might profitably speak of a form of 
moral responsibility according to which the social features of one’s practical identity 
can render one morally responsible, in a partly backward-looking way, for harms 
caused by a group-member. Call this, “associatively responsibility”.35 While I cannot 
provide a full account of the phenomenon here, it will be useful to at least motivate 
talk of moral responsibility in this context. 
Recall the intergroup antagonisms that tend to arise between members of 
groups in conflict, and the corresponding felt need for redress, i.e. for relatives (the 
associatively unlucky) to sometimes make amends. In addition to its being fitting for 
Rainer and Sue to have a guilt-like response, we found that negative partiality of a sort 
was intuitively licensed on the part of victims’ relatives. Consider again the student at 
Auschwitz who addresses Rainer Hoess to say that his grandfather tortured and 
exterminated her family, and who addresses her group thus: “isn’t he afraid of these 
encounters with us?” Does this interaction amount to blame? If blame necessarily 
involves the thought that its target is personally at fault, then no. But, allegiance to a 
fault-centered view might obscure important similarities between responses like the 
above and those more readily labeled ‘moral blame’ by philosophers.36 The student’s 
address toward Rainer seems (or can be adjusted with little effort) to have a 
condemnatory quality, one corresponding to Rainer’s own professed guilt and shame 
about the atrocities committed by his grandfather (and by extension, his family).  
  In any case, ‘blame’ is like ‘moral responsibility’ in being multiply ambiguous. 
As long as we proceed with due caution, we can understand ‘associative blame’ as an 
other-directed response characterized by expressions of negative partiality that call for 
their addressee to personally make amends, owing to their group-membership, and 
despite being personally faultless. Reference to something like associative blame 
seems useful for making sense of Sue’s and Rainer’s seeking something like 
forgiveness for the harms caused by their relatives.37 As long as we refrain from 
assimilating associative responsibility (and associative blame) to the kind of moral 
responsibility (and blame) that presupposes fault, talk of responsibility and blame in 
this context may be put to good use.38  
                                                        
35 See Sepinwall (2012; 2017, 525–526) for a view along these lines. See also Yankah (2017) for discussion 
that points in the direction of race-based associative responsibility in the United States. 
36 Perhaps allegiance of this sort is even criticizable for fetishizing fault. See Riedener (2021). 
37 If forgiveness also implies that the forgiven agent had been at fault, then perhaps we should speak 
here too of a related phenomenon: “associative forgiveness”. See Driver (2017) for discussion of cases 
in which forgiveness may be apt even when blame was not. 
38 One’s being associatively blameworthy, and thus the fitting target of others’ associative blame, does 
not imply that these responses are deserved. The desert-relation is typically understood as a relation of 




The morality system, however, would have us draw a starker boundary 
between moral blame and responses like those of agent-regret and relation-regret (along 
with their third-personal analogues). For, the morality system assures us, we can only 
be fittingly subject to the uniquely bad responses of blame by failing to do as obligated, 
which implies that we could have done so (Williams 1985, 174-183; Williams 1993b, 254). 
This optimistic picture, however, flagrantly conflicts with our practical sense of what 
is valuable, and what contributes to a good life.39 The idea that, as far as anything of 
supreme value is concerned, I am no different from the bystander, though it is I who 
have caused another’s death, overlooks something we recognize as mattering in our 
interpersonal practices, and mattering no less than those changes to the normative 
landscape that the morality system validates). Our sensitivity to the significance of 
some of the involuntary consequences of our own actions (and so, our commitment to 
resultant moral luck) puts pressure on the morality system’s insistence on the 
importance of the voluntary. Associative moral luck, by contrast, puts pressure on the 
morality system’s insistence on the importance of the harm’s being expressive of my 
agency.  
Our vulnerability to associative luck serves to highlight a commonality and 
difference between our moral universe and that of Homeric and Classical Greece. It is 
a recurring theme of ancient Greek drama that the son or daughter may “pay” for the 
crimes of their predecessors. When this idea is viewed under the guise of inherited guilt, 
it appears foreign to our moral sensibility. This may be especially so when one’s 
‘inheriting guilt’ serves as another’s reason for vengeful killing,40 e.g. when Aegisthus 
(son of Thyestes) collaborates in killing his cousin Agamemnon (son of Atreus), 
claiming his right of revenge for Atreus’ having fed Thyestes to his own children at a 
banquet.41 Though we regard scenes like these with horror (at least when portrayed 
compellingly), the intelligibility and seeming fittingness of responses like those of 
                                                        
(Feinberg 1970). The desert-relation, however, is only one of several appropriateness relations and is 
presumably (owing to its connection to fault) of the wrong kind (in the sense of being an inapplicable) 
for determining whether an agent is associatively responsible.  
39 For a more direct objection concerning the possibly self-undermining nature of the morality system’s 
drive towards “absolute fairness,” see Russell (2017, 260).  
40 Dodds claims that in addition to Hesiod, Theognis, and Herodotus, Aeschylus “accepted the idea of 
inherited guilt and deferred punishment… it appeared as a law of nature, which must be accepted: for 
the family was a moral unit, the son’s life was a prolongation of his father’s, and he inherited his father’s 
moral debts exactly as he inherited his commercial ones” (Dodds 1951, 33–34). But see Gantz (1982). 
41 Agamemnon’s death, however, is overdetermined. At least, the motives (and justifications given) for 
Agamemnon’s murder are not limited to the revenge of the House of Thyestes. Clytemnestra 
(Aegisthus’s lover and co-conspirator) importantly has multiple motives for vengeance against her 
husband. In some versions of the story, Agamemnon dies by Aegisthus’s hand, and in others, by 
Clytemnestra’s. But, even in Aeschylus’s version, where the murderous plot culminates in 
Clytemnestra’s acts of fatally stabbing Agamemnon, Clytemnestra identifies Atreus’s banquet as 




Rainer Hoess and Sue Klebold suggest that the distance between our and the 
normative universe of Homeric and Classical Greece may be shorter than we care to 
admit. 
The point here is not that we remain beholden to ‘morally primitive’ practices. 
After all, the conditions underlying relation-regret are the very same that, in other 
contexts, provide our lives with considerable value and joy. The social nature of our 
practical identities renders us vulnerable not only to relation-regret; it makes possible 
positive, pride-like, attitudes and expressions in response to the achievements of those 
to whom we are attached. Consider, for example, the pride the granddaughter might 
feel in her grandmother’s work in the civil rights movement, work performed before 
the granddaughter’s birth. It would be a mistake to construe this point as one about 
the demands of consistency. That is, the point here is not that consistency demands 
that, if we take pride in the successes and achievements of those near and dear, we 
must also respond with relation-regret when such relations cause others serious harm. 
For, ‘should I have a practical identity that is also a social identity?’ is not obviously a 
question that one can sensibly raise for oneself. While we sometimes (endeavor to) 
associate with particular persons and groups, and to dissociate with others, these 
‘local’ changes in social relations are sought from a perspective that presupposes the 
sociality of our practical identities. The sociality of our practical identities is that in 
virtue of which we participate meaningfully in the lives of others, others qua our family 
members, friends, teammates, fellow citizens, etc.           
The idea that, as agents, we are non-trivially more than what we voluntarily do, 
is an important insight forcefully made by Williams at several stages in his 
philosophical career. “The mature moral agent,” Williams claims (1995, 32), “will 
recognize his relation to his acts in their undeliberated, and also in their unforeseen 
and unintended aspects. He recognizes that his identity as an agent is constituted by 
more than his deliberative self.” If there is truth to what I have proposed concerning 
relation-regret and associative luck, an enlarged picture of the mature moral agent 
emerges: one who lives also with the truth that his identity is in many ways a social 
identity, such that the actions of those to whom he is attached can alter his practical 
identity, who he most deeply is.42 
 
 
                                                        
42 For valuable discussion and comments, I thank David Enoch, Leora Dahan Katz, Avishai Margalit, 
Oded Na’aman, Ittay Nissan Rozen, and Daniel Story. I especially want to thank the volume’s 
editors, András Szigeti and Matt Talbert, for their insightful comments and suggestions. An early 
version of this paper benefitted from presentation at the 2019 meeting of the Israeli Philosophical 
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